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Machiavelli's work is a dialogue between  Cosimo Rucellai, a Florentine gentleman, and the Papal Captain, Fabrizio Colonna, consisting mostly of the critique of contemporary practices of war in comparison to those of the ancient Romans.  We enter mid-discussion:

FABRIZIO: I am most content that you, Cosimo, with these other young people here, should question me,
for I believe that young men will become more familiar with military matters, and will more easily
understand what I have to say. The others, whose hair (head) is white and whose blood is icy, in part are
enemies of war and in part incorrigible, as those who believe that the times and not the evil ways
constrain men to live in such a fashion. So ask anything of me, with assurance and without regard; I
desire this, as much because it will afford me a little rest, as because it will give me pleasure not to leave
any doubts in your minds. I want to begin from your words, where you said to me that in war ((which is
my profession)) I have not employed any of the ancient methods. Upon this I say, that this being a
profession by which men of every time were not able to live honestly, it cannot be employed as a
profession except by a Republic or a Kingdom; and both of these, if well established, will never allow any
of their citizens or subjects to employ it as a profession: for he who practices it will never be judged to
be good, as to gain some usefulness from it at any time he must be rapacious, deceitful, violent, and have
many qualities, which of necessity, do not make him good: nor can men who employ this as a profession,
the great as well as the least, be made otherwise, for this profession does not provide for them in peace.
Whence they are obliged, either to hope that there will be no peace or to gain so much for themselves in
times of war, that they can provide for themselves in times of peace. And wherever one of these two
thoughts exists, it does not occur in a good man; for, from the desire to provide for oneself in every
circumstance, robberies, violence and assassinations result, which such soldiers do to friends as well as
to enemies: and from not desiring peace, there arises those deceptions which Captains perpetrate upon
those whom they lead, because war hardens them: and even if peace occurs frequently, it happens that
the leaders, being deprived of their stipends and of their licentious mode of living, raise a flag of piracy,
and without any mercy sack a province.

Do you not have within the memory of events of your time, many soldiers in Italy, finding themselves
without employment because of the termination of wars, gathered themselves into very troublesome
gangs, calling themselves companies, and went about levying tribute on the towns and sacking the
country, without there being any remedy able to be applied? Have you not read how the Carthaginian
soldiers, when the first war they engaged in with the Romans under Matus and Spendius was ended,
tumultuously chose two leaders, and waged a more dangerous war against the Carthaginians than that
which they had just concluded with the Romans? And in the time of our fathers, Francesco Sforza, in
order to be able to live honorably (comfortably) in times of peace, not only deceived the Milanese, in
whose pay he was, but took away their liberty and became their Prince. All the other soldiers of Italy, who
have employed the military as their particular profession, have been like this man; and if, through their
malignity, they have not become Dukes of Milan, so much more do they merit to be censured; for without
such a return ((if their lives were to be examined)), they all have the same cares. Sforza, father of
Francesco, constrained Queen Giovanna to throw herself into the arms of the King of Aragon, having
abandoned her suddenly, and left her disarmed amid her enemies, only in order to satisfy his ambition
of either levying tribute or taking the Kingdom. Braccio, with the same industry, sought to occupy the
Kingdom of Naples, and would have succeeded, had he not been routed and killed at Aquilla. Such evils
do not result from anything else other than the existence of men who employ the practice of soldiering as
their own profession. Do you not have a proverb which strengthens my argument, which says: War makes
robbers, and peace hangs them? For those who do not know how to live by another practice, and not
finding any one who will support them in that, and not having so much virtu that they know how to come
and live together honorably, are forced by necessity to roam the streets, and justice is forced to
extinguish them.

COSIMO: You have made me turn this profession (art) of soldiering back almost to nothing, and I had
supposed it to be the most excellent and most honorable of any: so that if you do not clarify this better, I
will not be satisfied; for if it is as you say, I do not know whence arises the glory of Caesar, Pompey,
Scipio, Marcellus, and of so many Roman Captains who are celebrated for their fame as the Gods.

FABRIZIO: I have not yet finished discussing all that I proposed, which included two things: the one, that
a good man was not able to undertake this practice because of his profession: the other, that a well
established Republic or Kingdom would never permit its subjects or citizens to employ it for their
profession. Concerning the first, I have spoken as much as has occurred to me: it remains for me to talk
of the second, where I shall reply to this last question of yours, and I say that Pompey and Caesar, and
almost all those Captains who were in Rome after the last Carthaginian war, acquired fame as valiant
men, not as good men: but those who had lived before them acquired glory as valiant and good men:
which results from the fact that these latter did not take up the practice of war as their profession; and
those whom I named first as those who employed it as their profession. And while the Republic lived
immaculately, no great citizen ever presumed by means of such a practice to enrich himself during
(periods of) peace by breaking laws, despoiling the provinces, usurping and tyrannizing the country, and
imposing himself in every way; nor did anyone of the lowest fortune think of violating the sacred
agreement, adhere himself to any private individual, not fearing the Senate, or to perform any disgraceful
act of tyranny in order to live at all times by the profession of war. But those who were Captains, being
content with the triumph, returned with a desire for the private life; and those who were members (of the
army) returned with a desire to lay down the arms they had taken up; and everyone returned to the art
(trade or profession) by which they ordinarily lived; nor was there ever anyone who hoped to provide for
himself by plunder and by means of these arts. A clear and evident example of this as it applies to great
citizens can be found in the Regent Attilio, who, when he was captain of the Roman armies in Africa, and
having almost defeated the Carthaginians, asked the Senate for permission to return to his house to look
after his farms which were being spoiled by his laborers. Whence it is clearer than the sun, that if that
man had practiced war as his profession, and by means of it thought to obtain some advantage for
himself, having so many provinces which (he could) plunder, he would not have asked permission to
return to take care of his fields, as each day he could have obtained more than the value of all his
possessions. But as these good men, who do not practice war as their profession, do not expect to gain
anything from it except hard work, danger, and glory, as soon as they are sufficiently glorious, desire to
return to their homes and live from the practice of their own profession. As to men of lower status and
gregarious soldiers, it is also true that every one voluntarily withdrew from such a practice, for when he
was not fighting would have desired to fight, but when he was fighting wanted to be dismissed. Which
illustrates the many ways, and especially in seeing that it was among the first privileges, that the Roman
people gave to one of its Citizens, that he should not be constrained unwillingly to fight. Rome, therefore,
while she was well organized ((which it was up to the time of the Gracchi)) did not have one soldier who
had to take up this practice as a profession, and therefore had few bad ones, and these were severely
punished. A well ordered City, therefore, ought to desire that this training for war ought to be employed
in times of peace as an exercise, and in times of war as a necessity and for glory, and allow the public
only to use it as a profession, as Rome did. And any citizen who has other aims in (using) such exercises
is not good, and any City which governs itself otherwise, is not well ordered.

COSIMO: I am very much content and satisfied with what you have said up to now, and this conclusion
which you have made pleases me greatly: and I believe it will be true when expected from a Republic, but
as to Kings, I do not yet know why I should believe that a King would not want particularly to have
around him those who take up such a practice as their profession.

FABRIZIO: A well ordered Kingdom ought so much the more avoid such artifices, for these only are the
things which corrupt the King and all the Ministers in a Tyranny. And do not, on the other side, tell me of
some present Kingdom, for I will not admit them to be all well ordered Kingdoms; for Kingdoms that are
well ordered do not give absolute (power to) Rule to their Kings, except in the armies, for only there is a
quick decision necessary, and, therefore, he who (rules) there must have this unique power: in other
matters, he cannot do anything without counsel, and those who counsel him have to fear those whom he
may have near him who, in times of peace, desire war because they are unable to live without it. But I
want to dwell a little longer on this subject, and look for a Kingdom totally good, but similar to those
that exist today, where those who take up the profession of war for themselves still ought to be feared by
the King, for the sinews of armies without any doubt are the infantry. So that if a King does not organize
himself in such a way that his infantry in time of peace are content to return to their homes and live from
the practice of their own professions, it must happen of necessity that he will be ruined; for there is not
to be found a more dangerous infantry than that which is composed of those who make the waging of war
their profession; for you are forced to make war always, or pay them always, or to risk the danger that
they take away the Kingdom from you. To make war always is not possible: (and) one cannot pay always;
and, hence, that danger is run of losing the State. My Romans ((as I have said)), as long as they were wise
and good, never permitted that their citizens should take up this practice as their profession,
notwithstanding that they were able to raise them at all times, for they made war at all times: but in
order to avoid the harm which this continuous practice of theirs could do to them, since the times did
not change, they changed the men, and kept turning men over in their legions so that every fifteen years
they always completely re-manned them: and thus they desired men in the flower of their age, which is
from eighteen to thirty five years, during which time their legs, their hands, and their eyes, worked
together, nor did they expect that their strength should decrease in them, or that malice should grow in
them, as they did in corrupt times.

Ottavianus first, and then Tiberius, thinking more of their own power than the public usefulness, in order
to rule over the Roman people more easily, begun to disarm them and to keep the same armies
continually at the frontiers of the Empire. And because they did not think it sufficient to hold the Roman
People and the Senate in check, they instituted an army called the Praetorian (Guard), which was kept
near the walls of Rome in a fort adjacent to that City. And as they now begun freely to permit men
assigned to the army to practice military matters as their profession, there soon resulted that these men
became insolent, and they became formidable to the Senate and damaging to the Emperor. Whence there
resulted that many men were killed because of their insolence, for they gave the Empire and took it away
from anyone they wished, and it often occurred that at one time there were many Emperors created by
the several armies. From which state of affairs proceeded first the division of the Empire and finally its
ruin. Kings ought, therefore, if they want to live securely, have their infantry composed of men, who,
when it is necessary for him to wage war, will willingly go forth to it for love of him, and afterwards when
peace comes, more willingly return to their homes; which will always happen if he selects men who know
how to live by a profession other than this. And thus he ought to desire, with the coming of peace, that
his Princes return to governing their people, gentlemen to the cultivation of their possessions, and the
infantry to their particular arts (trades or professions); and everyone of these will willingly make war in
order to have peace, and will not seek to disturb the peace to have war.

COSIMO: Truly, this reasoning of yours appears to me well considered: none the less, as it is almost
contrary to what I have thought up to now, my mind is not yet purged of every doubt. For I see many
Lords and Gentlemen who provide for themselves in times of peace through the training for war, as do
your equals who obtain provisions from Princes and the Community. I also see almost all the men at arms
remaining in the garrisons of the city and of the fortresses. So that it appears to me that there is a long
time of peace for everyone.

FABRIZIO: I do not believe that you believe this, that everyone has a place in time of peace; for other
reasons can be cited for their being stationed there, and the small number of people who remain in the
places mentioned by you will answer your question. What is the proportion of infantry needed to be
employed in time of war to that in peace? for while the fortresses and the city are garrisoned in times of
peace, they are much more garrisoned in times of war; to this should be added the soldiers kept in the
field who are a great number, but all of whom are released in time of peace. And concerning the
garrisons of States, who are a small number, Pope Julius and you have shown how much they are to be
feared who do not know any other profession than war, as you have taken them out of your garrisons
because of their insolence, and placed the Swiss there, who are born and raised under the laws and are
chosen by the community in an honest election; so do not say further that in peace there is a place for
every man. As to the men at arms continued in their enlistment in peace time, the answer appears more
difficult. None the less, whoever considers everything well, will easily find the answer, for this thing of
keeping on the men at arms is a corrupt thing and not good. The reason is this; as there are men who do
not have any art (trade or profession), a thousand evils will arise every day in those States where they
exist, and especially so if they were to be joined by a great number of companions: but as they are few,
and unable by themselves to constitute an army, they therefore, cannot do any serious damage. None the
less, they have done so many times, as I said of Francesco and of Sforza, his father, and of Braccio of
Perugia. So I do not approve of this custom of keeping men at arms, both because it is corrupt and
because it can cause great evils.

COSIMO: Would you do without them?, or if you keep them, how would you do so?

FABRIZIO: By means of an ordinance, not like those of the King of France, because they are as dangerous
and insolent as ours, but like those of the ancients, who created horsemen (cavalry) from their subjects,
and in times of peace sent them back to their homes to live from the practice of their own profession, as
I shall discuss at length before I finish this discussion. So, if this part of the army can now live by such a
practice even when there is peace, it stems from a corrupt order. As to the provisions that are reserved
for me and the other leaders, I say to you that this likewise is a most corrupt order, for a wise Republic
ought not to give them to anyone, rather it ought to employ its citizens as leaders in war, and in time of
peace desire that they return to their professions. Thus also, a wise King ought not to give (provisions) to
them, or if he does give them, the reasons ought to be either as a reward for some excellent act, or in
order to avail himself of such a man in peace as well as in war. And because you have mentioned me, I
want the example to include me, and I say I have never practiced war as a profession, for my profession
is to govern my subjects, and defend them, and in order to defend them, I must love peace but know how
to make war; and my King does not reward and esteem me so much for what I know of war, as because I
know also how to counsel him in peace. Any King ought not, therefore, to want to have next to him
anyone who is not thusly constituted, if he is wise and wants to govern prudently; for if he has around
him either too many lovers of peace or too many lovers of war, they will cause him to err. I cannot, in
this first discussion of mine and according to my suggestion, say otherwise, and if this is not enough for
you, you must seek one which satisfies you better. You can begin to recognize how much difficulty there
is in bringing the ancient methods into modem wars, and what preparations a wise man must make, and
what opportunities he can hope for to put them into execution. But little by little you will know these
things better if the discussion on bringing any part of the ancient institutions to the present order of
things does not weary you.

COSIMO: If we first desired to hear your discussion of these matters, truly what you have said up to now
redoubles that desire. We thank you, therefore, for what we have had and ask you for the rest.

FABRIZIO: Since this is your pleasure, I want to begin to treat of this matter from the beginning being able
in that way to demonstrate it more fully, so that it may be better understood. The aim of those who want
to make war is to be able to combat in the field with every (kind) of enemy, and to be able to win the
engagement. To want to do this, they must raise an army. In raising an army, it is necessary to find men,
arm them, organize them, train them in small and large (battle) orders, lodge them, and expose them to
the enemy afterwards, either at a standstill or while marching. All the industry of war in the field is
placed in these things, which are the more necessary and honored (in the waging of war). And if one does
well in offering battle to the enemy, all the other errors he may make in the conduct of the war are
supportable: but if he lacks this organization, even though he be valiant in other particulars, he will never
carry on a war to victory (and honor). For, as one engagement that you win cancels out every other bad
action of yours, so likewise, when you lose one, all the things you have done well before become useless.
Since it is necessary, therefore, first to find men, you must come to the Deletto (Draft) of them, as thus
the ancients called it, and which we call Scelta (Selection): but in order to call it by a more honored name,
I want us to preserve the name of Deletto. Those who have drawn up regulations for war want men to be
chosen from temperate countries as they have spirit and are prudent; for warm countries give rise to
men who are prudent but not spirited, and cold (countries) to men who are spirited but not prudent. This
regulation is drawn up well for one who is the Prince of all the world, and is therefore permitted to draw
men from those places that appear best to him: but wanting to draw up a regulation that anyone can use,
one must say that every Republic and every Kingdom ought to take soldiers from their own country,
whether it is hot, cold, or temperate. For, from ancient examples, it is seen that in every country, good
soldiers are made by training; because where nature is lacking, industry supplies it, which, in this case, is
worth more than nature: And selecting them from another place cannot be called Deletto, because Deletto
means to say to take the best of a province, and to have the power to select as well those who do not
want to fight as those who do want to. This Deletto therefore, cannot be made unless the places are
subject to you; for you cannot take whoever you want in the countries that are not yours, but you need to
take those who want to come.

COSIMO: And of those who want to come, it can even be said, that they turn and leave you, and because
of this, it can then be called a Deletto.

FABRIZIO: In a certain way, you say what is true: but consider the defects that such as Deletto has in itself,
for often it happens that it is not a Deletto. The first thing (to consider), is that those who are not your
subjects and do not willingly want to fight, are not of the best, rather they are of the worst of a province;
for if nay are troublesome, idle, without restraint, without religion, subject to the rule of the father,
blasphemous, gamblers, and in every way badly brought up, they are those who want to fight, (and) these
habits cannot be more contrary to a true and good military life. When there are so many of such men
offered to you that they exceed the number you had designated, you can select them; but if the material
is bad, it is impossible for the Deletto to be good: but many times it happens that they are not so many as
(are needed) to fill the number you require: so that being forced to take them all, it results that it can no
longer be called the making of a Deletto, but in enlisting of infantry. The armies of Italy and other places
are raised today with these evils, except in Germany, where no one is enlisted by command of the Prince,
but according to the wishes of those who want to fight. Think, therefore, what methods of those ancients
can now be introduced in an army of men put together by similar means.

COSIMO: What means should be taken therefore?

FABRIZIO: What I have just said: select them from your own subjects, and with the authority of the Prince.

COSIMO: Would you introduce any ancient form in those thus selected?

FABRIZIO: You know well it would be so; if it is a Principality, he who should command should be their
Prince or an ordinary Lord; or if it is a Republic, a citizen who for the time should be Captain: otherwise
it is difficult to do the thing well.

COSIMO: Why?

FABRIZIO: I will tell you in time: for now, I want this to suffice for you, that it cannot be done well in any
other way.

COSIMO: If you have, therefore, to make ibis Deletto in your country, whence do you judge it better to
draw them, from the City or the Countryside?

FABRIZIO: Those who have written of this all agree that it is better to select them from the Countryside,
as they are men accustomed to discomfort, brought up on hard work, accustomed to be in the sun and
avoid the shade, know how to handle the sword, dig a ditch, carry a load, and are without cunning or
malice. But on this subject, my opinion would be, that as soldiers are of two kinds, afoot and on
horseback, that those afoot be selected from the Countryside, and those on horseback from the City.

COSIMO: Of what age would you draw them?

FABRIZIO: If I had to raise an (entirely) new army, I would draw them from seventeen to forty years of
age; if the army already exists and I had to replenish it, at seventeen years of age always.

COSIMO: I do not understand this distinction well.

FABRIZIO: I will tell you: if I should have to organize an army where there is none, it would be necessary
to select all those men who were more capable, as long as they were of military age, in order to instruct
them as I would tell them: but if I should have to make the Deletto in places where the army was (already)
organized, in order to supplement it, I would take those of seventeen years of age, because the others
having been taken for some time would have been selected and instructed.

COSIMO: Therefore you would want to make an ordinance similar to that which exists in our countries.

FABRIZIO: You say well: it is true that I would arm them, captain them, train them, and organize them, in
a way which I do not know whether or not you have organized them similarly.

COSIMO: Therefore you praise the ordinance?

FABRIZIO: Why would you want me to condemn it?

COSIMO: Because many wise men have censured it.

FABRIZIO: You say something contrary, when you say a wise man censured the ordinance: for he can be
held a wise man and to have censured them wrongly.

COSIMO: The wrong conclusion that he has made will always cause us to have such a opinion.

FABRIZIO: Watch out that the defect is not yours, but his: as that which you recognized before this
discussion furnishes proof.

COSIMO: You do a most gracious thing. But I want to tell you that you should be able to justify yourself
better in that of which those men are accused. These men say thusly: either that it is useless and our
trusting in it will cause us to lose the State: or it is of virtue, and he who governs through it can easily
deprive her of it. They cite the Romans, who by their own arms lost their liberty: They cite the Venetians
and the King of France, of whom they say that the former, in order not to obey one of its Citizens
employed the arms of others, and the King disarmed his People so as to be able to command them more
easily. But they fear the uselessness of this much more; for which uselessness they cite two principal
reasons: the one, because they are inexpert; the other, for having to fight by force: because they say that
they never learn anything from great men, and nothing good is ever done by force.

FABRIZIO: All the reasons that you mention are from men who are not far sighted, as I shall clearly show.
And first, as to the uselessness, I say to you that no army is of more use than your own, nor can an army
of your own be organized except in this way. And as there is no debating over this, which all the
examples of ancient history does for us, I do not want to lose time over it. And because they cite
inexperience and force, I say ((as it is true)) that inept experience gives rise to little spirit (enthusiasm)
and force makes for discontent: but experience and enthusiasm gains for themselves the means for
arming, training, and organizing them, as you will see in the first part of this discussion. But as to force,
you must understand that as men are brought to the army by commandment of the Prince, they have to
come, whether it is entirely by force or entirely voluntarily: for if it were entirely from desire, there
would not be a Deletto as only a few of them would go; so also, the (going) entirely by force would
produce bad results; therefore, a middle way ought to be taken where neither the entirely forced or
entirely voluntarily (means are used), but they should come, drawn by the regard they have for the Prince,
where they are more afraid of of his anger then the immediate punishment: and it will always happen
that there will be a compulsion mixed with willingness, from which that discontent cannot arise which
causes bad effects. Yet I do not claim that an army thus constituted cannot be defeated; for many times
the Roman armies were overcome, and the army of Hannibal was defeated: so that it can be seen that no
army can be so organized that a promise can be given that it cannot be routed. These wise men of yours,
therefore, ought not measure this uselessness from having lost one time, but to believe that just as they
can lose, so too they can win and remedy the cause of the defeat. And if they should look into this, they
will find that it would not have happened because of a defect in the means, but of the organization which
was not sufficiently perfect. And, as I have said, they ought to provide for you, not by censuring the
organization, but by correcting it: as to how this ought to be done, you will come to know little by little.

As to being apprehensive that such organization will not deprive you of the State by one who makes
himself a leader, I reply, that the arms carried by his citizens or subjects, given to them by laws and
ordinances, never do him harm, but rather are always of some usefulness, and preserve the City
uncorrupted for a longer time by means of these (arms), than without (them). Rome remained free four
hundred years while armed: Sparta eight hundred: Many other Cities have been dis-armed, and have
been free less than forty years; for Cities have need of arms, and if they do not have arms of their own,
they hire them from foreigners, and the arms of foreigners more readily do harm to the public good than
their own; for they are easier to corrupt, and a citizen who becomes powerful can more readily avail
himself, and can also manage the people more readily as he has to oppress men who are disarmed. In
addition to this, a City ought to fear two enemies more than one. One which avails itself of foreigners
immediately has to fear not only its citizens, but the foreigners that it enlists; and, remembering what I
told you a short while ago of Francesco Sforza, (you will see that) that fear ought to exist. One which
employs its own arms, has not other fear except of its own Citizens. But of all the reasons which can be
given, I want this one to serve me, that no one ever established any Republic or Kingdom who did not
think that it should be defended by those who lived there with arms: and if the Venetians had been as
wise in this as in their other institutions, they would have created a new world Kingdom; but who so
much more merit censure, because they had been the first who were armed by their founders. And not
having dominion on land, they armed themselves on the sea, where they waged war with virtu, and with
arms in hand enlarged their country. But when the time came when they had to wage war on land to
defend Venice and where they ought to have sent their own citizens to fight (on land), they enlisted as
their captain (a foreigner), the Marquis of Mantua. This was the sinister course which prevented them
from rising to the skies and expanding. And they did this in the belief that, as they knew how to wage
war at sea, they should not trust themselves in waging it on land; which was an unwise belief (distrust),
because a Sea captain, who is accustomed to combat with winds, water, and men, could more easily
become a Captain on land where the combat is with men only, than a land Captain become a sea one. And
my Romans, knowing how to combat on land and not on the sea, when the war broke out with the
Carthaginians who were powerful on the sea, did not enlist Greeks or Spaniards experienced at sea, but
imposed that change on those citizens they sent (to fight) on land, and they won. If they did this in order
that one of their citizens should not become Tyrant, it was a fear that was given little consideration; for,
in addition to the other reasons mentioned a short while ago concerning such a proposal, if a citizen
(skilled) in (the use of) arms at sea had never been made a Tyrant in a City situated in the sea, so much
less would he be able to do this if he were (skilled) in (the use of arms) on land. And, because of this,
they ought to have seen that arms in the hands of their own citizens could not create Tyrants, but the evil
institutions of a Government are those which cause a City to be tyrannized; and, as they had a good
Government, did not have to fear arms of their own citizens. They took an imprudent course, therefore,
which was the cause of their being deprived of much glory and happiness. As to the error which the King
of France makes in not having his people disciplined to war, from what has been cited from examples
previously mentioned, there is no one ((devoid of some particular passion of theirs)) who does not judge
this defect to be in the Republic, and that this negligence alone is what makes it weak. But I have made
too great a digression and have gotten away from my subject: yet I have done this to answer you and to
show you, that no reliance can be had on arms other than ones own, and ones own arms cannot be
established otherwise than by way of an ordinance, nor can forms of armies be introduced in any place,
nor military discipline instituted. If you have read the arrangements which the first Kings made in Rome,
and most especially of Servius Tullus, you will find that the institution of classes is none other than an
arrangement to be able quickly to put together an army for the defense of that City. But turning to our
Deletto, I say again, that having to replenish an established (old) organization, I would take the seventeen
year olds, but having to create a new one, I would take them of every age between seventeen and forty in
order to avail myself of them quickly.

COSIMO: Would you make a difference of what profession (art) you would choose them from?

FABRIZIO: These writers do so, for they do not want that bird hunters, fishermen, cooks, procurers, and
anyone who makes amusement his calling should be taken, but they want that, in addition to tillers of the
soil, smiths and blacksmiths, carpenters, butchers, hunters, and such like, should be taken. But I would
make little difference in conjecturing from his calling how good the man may be, but how much I can use
him with the greatest usefulness. And for this reason, the peasants, who are accustomed to working the
land, are more useful than anyone else, for of all the professions (arts), this one is used more than any
other in the army: After this, are the forgers (smiths), carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers; of whom it is
useful to have many, for their skills succeed in many things, as they are a very good thing for a soldier to
have, from whom you draw double service.

COSIMO: How are those who are or are not suitable to fight chosen?

FABRIZIO: I want to talk of the manner of selecting a new organization in order to make it after wards
into an army; which yet also apply in the discussion of the selection that should be made in re-manning
an old (established) organization. I say, therefore, that how good the man is that you have to select as a
soldier is recognized either from his experience, shown by some excellent deeds of his, or by conjecture.
The proof of virtu cannot be found in men who are newly selected, and who never before have been
selected; and of the former, few or none are found in an organization which is newly established. It is
necessary, therefore, lacking experience to have recourse to conjecture, which is derived from their age,
profession, and physical appearance. The first two have been discussed: it remains to talk of the third.
And yet I say that some have wanted that the soldier be big, among whom was Pyrrhus: Some others have
chosen them only from the strength of the body, as Caesar did: which strength of body is conjectured
from the composition of the members and the gracefulness of aspect. And yet some of those who write
say that he should have lively and merry eyes, a nervy neck, a large breast, muscular arms, long fingers, a
small stomach, round hips, sleek legs and feet: which parts usually render a man strong and agile, which
are the two things sought above everything else in a soldier. He ought, above all, to have regard for his
habits and that there should be in him a (sense of) honesty and shame, otherwise there will be selected
only an instrument of trouble and a beginning of corruption; for there is no one who believes that in a
dishonest education and in a brutish mind, there can exist some virtu which in some part may be
praiseworthy. Nor does it appear to me superfluous, rather I believe it necessary, in order for you to
understand better the importance of this selection, to tell you the method that the Roman Consuls at the
start of their Magistracy observed in selecting the Roman legions. In which Deletto, because those who had
to be selected were to be a mixture of new and veteran men ((because of the continuing wars)), they
proceeded from experience with regard to the old (veteran) men, and from conjecture with regard to the
new. And this ought to be noted, that these Deletti are made, either for immediate training and use, or for
future employment.

I have talked, and will talk, of those that are made for future employment, because my intention is to
show you how an army can be organized in countries where there is no military (organization), in which
countries I cannot have Deletti in order to make use of them. But in countries where it is the custom to
call out armies, and by means of the Prince, these (Deletti) exist, as was observed at Rome and is today
observed among the Swiss. For in these Deletti, if they are for the (selection of) new men, there are so
many others accustomed to being under military orders, that the old (veteran) and new, being mixed
together, make a good and united body. Notwithstanding this, the Emperors, when they began to hold
fixed the (term of service of the) soldiers, placed new men in charge over the soldiers, whom they called
Tironi, as teachers to train them, as is seen in the life of the Emperor Maximus: which thing, while Rome
was free, was instituted, not in the army, but within the City: and as the military exercises where the
young men were trained were in the City, there resulted that those then chosen to go to war, being
accustomed in the method of mock warfare, could easily adapt themselves to real war. But afterwards,
when these Emperors discontinued these exercises, it was necessary to employ the methods I have
described to you. Arriving, therefore, at the methods of the Roman Selection, I say that, as soon as the
Roman Consuls, on whom was imposed the carrying on of the war, had assumed the Magistracy, in
wanting to organize their armies ((as it was the custom that each of them had two legions of Roman men,
who were the nerve (center) of their armies)), created twenty four military Tribunes, proposing six for
each legion, who filled that office which today is done by those whom we call Constables. After they had
assembled all the Roman men adept at carrying arms, and placed the Tribunes of each legion apart from
each of the others. Afterwards, by lot they drew the Tribes, from which the first Selection was to be
made, and of that Tribe they selected four of their best men, from whom one was selected by the
Tribunes of the first legion, and of the other three, one was selected by the Tribunes of the second legion;
of the other two, one was selected by the Tribunes of the third, and that last belonged to the fourth
legion. After these four, four others were selected, of whom the first man was selected by the Tribunes of
the second legion, the second by those of the third, the third by those of the fourth, the fourth remained
to the first. After, another four were chosen: the first man was selected by the (Tribunes of the) third
(legion), the second by the fourth, the third by the first, the fourth remained to the second. And thus this
method of selection changed successively, so that the selection came to be equal, and the legions
equalized. And as we said above, this was done where the men were to be used immediately: and as it
was formed of men of whom a good part were experienced in real warfare, and everyone in mock battles,
this Deletto was able to be based on conjecture and experience. But when a new army was to be organized
and the selection made for future employment, this Deletto cannot be based except on conjecture, which
is done by age and physical appearance.

COSIMO: I believe what you have said is entirely true: but before you pass on to other discussion, I want
to ask about one thing which you have made me remember, when you said that the Deletto which should
be made where these men are not accustomed to fighting should be done by conjecture: for I have heard
our organization censured in many of its parts, and especially as to number; for many say that a lesser
number ought to be taken, of whom those that are drawn would be better and the selection better, as
there would not be as much hardship imposed on the men, and some reward given them, by means of
which they would be more content and could be better commanded. Whence I would like to know your
opinion on this part, and if you preferred a greater rather than a smaller number, and what methods you
would use in selecting both numbers.

FABRIZIO: Without doubt the greater number is more desirable and more necessary than the smaller:
rather, to say better, where a great number are not available, a perfect organization cannot be made, and
I will easily refute all the reasons cited in favor of this. I say, therefore, first, that where there are many
people, as there are for example in Tuscany, does not cause you to have better ones, or that the Deletto is
more selective; for desiring in the selection of men to judge them on the basis of experience, only a very
few would probably be found in that country who would have had this experience, as much because few
have been in a war, as because of those few who have been, very few have ever been put to the test, so
that because of this they merit to be chosen before the others: so that whoever is in a similar situation
should select them, must leave experience to one side and take them by conjecture: and if I were brought
to such a necessity, I would want to see, if twenty young men of good physical appearance should come
before me, with what rule rule I ought to take some or reject some: so that without doubt I believe that
every man will confess that it is a much smaller error to take them all in arming and training them, being
unable to know (beforehand) which of them are better, and to reserve to oneself afterwards to make a
more certain Deletto where, during the exercises with the army, those of greater courage and vitality may
be observed. So that, considering everything, the selection in this case of a few in order to have them
better, is entirely false. As to causing less hardship to the country and to the men, I say that the
ordinance, whether it is bad or insufficient, does not cause any hardship: for this order does not take
men away from their business, and does not bind them so that they cannot go to carry out their business,
because it only obliges them to come together for training on their free days, which proposition does not
do any harm either to the country or the men; rather, to the young, it ought to be delightful, for where, on
holidays they remain basely indolent in their hangouts, they would now attend these exercises with
pleasure, for the drawing of arms, as it is a beautiful spectacle, is thus delightful to the young men. As to
being able to pay (more to) the lesser number, and thereby keeping them more content and obedient, I
reply, that no organization of so few can be made, who are paid so continually, that their pay satisfies
them. For instance, if an army of five thousand infantry should be organized, in wanting to pay them so
that it should be believed they would be contented, they must be given at least ten thousand ducats a
month. To begin with, this number of infantry is not enough to make an army, and the payment is
unendurable to a State; and on the other hand, it is not sufficient to keep the men content and obligated
to respect your position. So that in doing this although much would be spent, it would provide little
strength, and would not be sufficient to defend you, or enable you to undertake any enterprise. If you
should give them more, or take on more, so much more impossible would it be for you to pay them: if
you should give them less, or take on fewer, so much less would be content and so much less useful
would they be to you. Therefore, those who consider things which are either useless or impossible. But it
is indeed necessary to pay them when they are levied to send to war.

But even if such an arrangement should give some hardship to those enrolled in it in times of peace,
which I do not see, they are still recompensed by all those benefits which an army established in a City
bring; for without them, nothing is secure. I conclude that whoever desires a small number in order to be
able to pay them, or for any other reason cited by you, does not know (what he is doing); for it will also
happen, in my opinion, that any number will always diminish in your hands, because of the infinite
impediments that men have; so that the small number will succeed at nothing. However, when you have a
large organization, you can at your election avail yourself of few or of many. In addition to this, it serves
you in fact and reputation, for the large number will always give you reputation. Moreover, in creating the
organization, in order to keep men trained, if you enroll a small number of men in many countries, and
the armies are very distant from each other, you cannot without the gravest injury to them assemble
them for (joint) exercises, and without this training the organization is useless, as will be shown in its
proper place.

COSIMO: What you have said is enough on my question: but I now desire that you resolve another doubt
for me. There are those who say that such a multitude of armed men would cause confusion, trouble, and
disorder in the country.

FABRIZIO: This is another vain opinion for the reason I will tell you. These organized under arms can
cause disorders in two ways: either among themselves, or against others; both of these can be obviated
where discipline by itself should not do so: for as to troubles among themselves, the organization
removes them, not brings them up, because in the organization you give them arms and leaders. If the
country where you organize them is so unwarlike that there are not arms among its men, and so united
that there are no leaders, such an organization will make them more ferocious against the foreigner, but
in no way will make it more disunited, because men well organized, whether armed or unarmed, fear the
laws, and can never change, unless the leaders you give them cause a change; and I will later tell you the
manner of doing this. But if the country where you have organized an army is warlike and disunited, this
organization alone is reason enough to unite them, for these men have arms and leaders for themselves:
but the arms are useless for war, and the leaders causes of troubles; but this organization gives them
arms useful for war, and leaders who will extinguish troubles; for as soon as some one is injured in that
country, he has recourse to his (leader) of the party, who, to maintain his reputation, advises him to
avenge himself, (and) not to remain in peace. The public leader does the contrary. So that by this means,
the causes for trouble are removed, and replaced by those for union; and provinces which are united but
effeminate (unwarlike) lose their usefulness but maintain the union, while those that are disunited and
troublesome remain united; and that disordinate ferocity which they usually employ, is turned to public
usefulness.

As to desiring that they do us injury against others, it should be kept in mind that they cannot do this
except by the leaders who govern them. In desiring that the leaders do not cause disorders, it is
necessary to have care that they do not acquire too much authority over them. And you have to keep in
mind that this authority is acquired either naturally or by accident: And as to nature, it must be provided
that whoever is born in one place is not put in charge of men enrolled in another place, but is made a
leader in those places where he does not have any natural connections. As to accidents, the organization
should be such that each year the leaders are exchanged from command to command; for continuous
authority over the same men generates so much unity among them, which can easily be converted into
prejudice against the Prince. As to these exchanges being useful to those who have employed them, and
injurious to those who have not observed them, is known from the example of the Kingdom of Assyria
and from the Empire of the Romans, in which it is seen that the former Kingdom endured a thousand
years without tumult and without civil war; which did not result from anything else than the exchanges of
those Captains, who were placed in charge of the care of the armies, from place to place every year. Nor,
for other reasons, (did it result) in the Roman Empire; once the blood (race) of Caesar was extinguished,
so many civil wars arose among the Captains of the armies, and so many conspiracies of the above
mentioned Captains against the Emperors, resulting from the continuing of those Captains in their same
Commands. And if any of those Emperors, and any who later held the Empire by reputation, such as
Hadrian, Marcus, Severus, and others like them, would have observed such happenings, and would have
introduced this custom of exchanging Captains in that Empire, without doubt they would have made it
more tranquil and lasting; for the Captains would have had fewer opportunities for creating tumults, and
the Emperors fewer causes to fear them, and the Senate, when there was a lack in the succession, would
have had more authority in the election of Emperors, and consequently, better conditions would have
resulted. But the bad customs of men, whether from ignorance or little diligence, or from examples of
good or bad, are never put aside.

COSIMO: I do not know if, with my question, I have gone outside the limits you set; for from the Deletto
we have entered into another discussion, and if I should not be excused a little, I shall believe I merit
some reproach.

FABRIZIO: This did us no harm; for all this discussion was necessary in wanting to discuss the
Organization (of an Army), which, being censured by many, it was necessary to explain it, if it is desired
that this should take place before the Deletto. And before I discuss the other parts, I want to discuss the
Deletto for men on horseback. This (selection) was done by the ancients from among the more wealthy,
having regard both for the age and quality of the men, selecting three hundred for each legion: so that the
Roman cavalry in every Consular army did not exceed six hundred.

COSIMO: Did you organize the cavalry in order to train them at home and avail yourself of them in the
future?

FABRIZIO: Actually it is a necessity and cannot be done otherwise, if you want to have them take up arms
for you, and not to want to take them away from those who make a profession of them.

COSIMO: How would you select them?

FABRIZIO: I would imitate the Romans: I would take the more wealthy, and give them leaders in the same
manner as they are given to others today, and I would arm them, and train them.

COSIMO: Would it be well to give these men some provision?

FABRIZIO: Yes, indeed: but only as much as is necessary to take care of the horse; for, as it brings an
expense to your subjects, they could complain of you. It would be necessary, therefore, to pay them for
the horse and its upkeep.

COSIMO: How many would you make? How would you arm them?

FABRIZIO: You pass into another discussion. I will tell you in its place, which will be when I have said how
the infantry ought to be armed, and how they should prepare for an engagement.