Machiavelli, The Discourses on the Ten Books of Livy
Taken from the Penguin edition (London: Penguin Books, 1970, 1983) Translator
Leslie J. Walker, edited by Bernard Crick.
Chances of good men doing what is necessary, and of bad men doing what
is good.
p. 163 [1.18] Now defective institutions must either be renovated all at
once as soon as the decline from goodness is noticed, or little by little
before they become known to everybody. Neither of which courses is possible,
I maintain. For if the renovation is to take place little by little,
there is need of someone who shall see the inconvenience coming while yet
it is far off and in its infancy. But it may quite easily happen
in a state that no such person will ever arise, or, should he arise in
point of fact, that he will never be able to persuade others to see things
as he does himself; for men accustomed to a certain mode of life are reluctant
to change it, especially when they have not themselves noticed the evil
in question, but have had their attention called to it by conjectures.
While with regard to modifying institutions all at once when everybody
realizes that they are no good, I would point out that, though it is easy
to recognize their futility, it is not easy to correct it; for, to do this,
normal methods will not suffice now that normal methods are bad. Hence
it is necessary to resort to extraordinary methods, such as the use of
force and an appeal to arms, and, before doing anything, to become a prince
in a state, so that one can dispose it as one sees fit. But
to reconstitute political life in a state presupposes a good man, whereas
to have recourse to violence in order to make oneself prince in a republic
supposes a bad man. Hence very rarely will there be found a good man ready
to use bad methods in order to make himself prince, though with a good
end in view, nor yet a bad man who, having become a prince, is ready to
do the right thing and to whose mind it will occur [p. 164] to use well
that authority which he has acquired by bad means.
The recommendation of extreme measures, and the danger of a middle path.
p. 176 [1.26] Should anyone become the ruler either of a city
or of a state,especially if he has no sure footing in it and it is suited
neither for the civic life characteristic of a monarchy nor yet that of
a republic, the best thing he can do in order to retain such a principality,
given that he be a new prince, is to organize everything in that state
afresh; e.g. in its cities to appoint new governors, with new titles and
a new authority, the governors themselves being new men; to make the rich
poor and the poor rich; as did David when he became king, `who filled the
hungry with good things and the rich sent empty away' [ref?]; aswell as
to build new cities, to destroy those already [p. 177] built, and to move
the inhabitants from one place to another far distant from it; in short,
to leave nothing of that province intact, and nothing in it, neither rank,
nor institution, nor form of government, nor wealth, except it be held
by such as recognize that it comes from you. His aim should be to
emulate Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, who, starting out as
a little king, by these methods made himself prince of Greece. Of him a
writer says that he moved men from province to province as shepherds move
their sheep. Such methods are exceedingly cruel, and are repugnant
to any community, not only to a Christian one, but to any composed of men.
It behooves, therefore, every man to shun them, and to prefer rather to
live as a private citizen than as a king with such ruination of men to
his score. None the less, for the sort of man who is unwilling to take
up this first course of well doing, it is expedient, should he wish to
hold what he has, to enter on the path of wrong doing. Actually, however,
most men prefer to steer a middle course, which is very harmful; for they
know not how to be wholly good nor yet wholly bad, as in the next chapter
will be shown by means of an example.
But at the same time Machiavelli seems to say that a free society cannot
honor or praise wrongdoing, regardless of the motivation?
p. 173 [1.24] The reason is that no well-ordered republic
allows the demerits of its citizens to be cancelled out by their merits;
but, having prescribed rewards for a good deed and punishment for a bad
one, and having rewarded someone for doing well, if that same person afterwards
does wrong, it punishes him, regardless of any of the good deeds he has
done. And, when such ordinances are duly observed, the city long enjoys
freedom, but otherwise will always be ruined.
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